Vatanka Reports
News and Analysis on the Greater Middle East 
 

On April 12, the United States and Iran wrapped up their first round of renewed diplomatic talks in Muscat, with round two set for April 19, in Rome. But the real breakthrough will not come from nuclear talks alone — it will require confronting the region’s most explosive fault line: the Iranian-Israeli standoff. Russia claims it can help.

It is no surprise that both Iran and the United States have approached their first diplomatic engagement in four years with wariness and skepticism. While not an insuperable hurdle, it is hard to overcome more than 40 years of mutual enmity. Both parties have set the stage with characteristic bellicosity.

The Iran-Russia-China partnership is often portrayed as a cohesive bloc resisting U.S. hegemony. While there is some truth to this narrative, it is frequently overstated. A closer look reveals a relationship driven more by pragmatic opportunism than ideological solidarity or durable alliance.

President Masoud Pezeshkian might be the loneliest man in Iran. Just eight months into his term in office, he is already losing the support of those who once championed him. Some sympathy is warranted. Still, Pezeshkian is not helping his own case. Elected on promises of reform, he has spent most of his time retreating.

After decades of managing tensions through careful balancing, Turkey and Iran now find themselves increasingly at odds following recent shifts in the regional balance of power.

In his second term in office, President Donald Trump faces a Middle East undergoing multifaceted upheaval and an Islamic Republic of Iran currently in its weakest and most isolated position since the founding of the regime in 1979.

As Donald Trump prepares to return to the White House, the main question in Tehran is not so much what the incoming American president will do about Iran. Rather, it is about whether Tehran should negotiate with him.

Iran’s leadership is still not ready to admit what many view as the inevitable need for a foreign policy course correction. Regime talking points notably suggest that the conflict with Israel is not an ideological decision but an unavoidable struggle over the national interest.

Whatever path Harris or Trump take on Iran, the best way forward is to work in closer alignment with its partners in the Middle East and build a stronger consensus at home

That Iranians overwhelmingly believe that the country’s foreign policy is the cause for the economic problems of ordinary citizens is accepted even among many of the regime’s diehard supporters. Nor is it surprising that many Iranians, particularly among the youth, are pessimistic about the future of Iran and are looking to emigrate.

The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is putting pressure on Tehran to choose between its ideological resistance to Israel’s right to exist and the core national interests of Iran, which are not linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But Israel does not expect Tehran to stand down.

Any Iranian effort to work toward a new nuclear deal without adjusting its regional policies risks meeting the same fate as the 2015 agreement. Significant relief from sanctions requires an Iranian-American process of détente that cannot be limited to the nuclear file. And herein lies Pezeshkian’s — and Khamenei’s — fundamental test.